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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Liens-Mechanics, Laborers, Materialmen-Acquisition and
Priorities
The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 states that: "The General
Assembly shall provide, by proper legislation, for giving to mechanics
and laborers an adequate lien on the subject matter of their labor."'
To comply with the constitutional mandate and to serve its purpose,
the General Assembly enacted what is now N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1
(1950).2 In addition to the constitutionally prescribed mechanic's and
laborer's liens, this statute also provides that there shall be a lien8 for
material furnished.4
The fundamental principle in lien law is that in order to have a lien
there must be between the parties an existent debt on a contract either
express or implied.6 This debt must have arisen by the furnishing of
labor or material, or both, 6 for the improvement of the property on
which the lien is to be acquired." In the case of each of these liens,
it is to be noted that the lien attaches to the property as improved and
not, as might be suspected in the case of the mechanic's and material-
man's liens, to the materials used in the improvement of the property.8
Thus the perfecting of a lien by a contractor, laborer or materialman
will ordinarily give him security well over the amount of his individual
claim.
In view of the fact that the lien attaches to the property, it is
apparent that the fundamental debt must exist between the prospective
N. C. CoNsT. Art. XIV §4.
' This note will contain a discussion of mechanic's, laborer's and materialman's
liens as acquired by independent contractors on real property. The rights of
subcontractors are not discussed in this note nor are the various other types of
liens provided for in the other sections of N. C. GEN. STAT. c. 44 (1943).3 When used in this note, the unmodified word lien shall mean lien as created
by N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1943).
'The lien for material furnished as distinguished from the mechanic's and
laborer's liens is statutory only and is not provided for in the constitution. The
importance of this appears in the fact that N. C. CoNsT. Art. X §4 provides that
the mechanic's and laborer's liens can defeat the homestead exemption; whereas,
the materialman's lien being purely statutory cannot. Cameron v. McDonald, 216
N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939); Broyhill v. Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E.
31 (1896) ; Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N. C. 83 (1882) ; Aycock, Homestead Ex-
emptions in North Carolincn, 29 N. C. L. RFZv. 143, 153 (1950); Boyd, Some
Phases of Title Examinatioi and Real Estate Practice, 20 N. C. L. RiV. 169, 173
(1942).
'Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942); Boykin v. Logan,
203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932) ; Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20 S.
E. 294 (1894).
'The mechanic's lien is broader than a lien for labor or material alone. The
mechanic's lien is for work done including both labor and material. Broyhill v.
Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896).
"Pocahontas Coal -Co. v. Henderson Light Co., 118 N. C. 232, 24 S. E. 22
(1896).
'Lanier v. Bell, 81 N. C . 337 (1879).
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lienor and the owner of the property against which the lien is sought.9
Therefore a person performing labor for, or furnishing material to,
a lessee or a tenant may be unable to secure a lien against the property
unless he can show that the lessee or tenant had authority to contract
for the owner.1 0 Thus from the rule that one may not be made a
debtor without his consent, it follows that a man's property may not
be made subject to a lien without his consent, express or implied.
When the laborer has rendered services for, or the materialman has
furnished material to, the owner of the premises under a contract ex-
press or implied, the debtor-creditor relationship arises; and, the laborer
or materialman is now in a position to perfect his lien. In order to
perfect his lien, the laborer or materialman must file a claim of lien "in
the office of the superior court clerk in any county where the labor has
been performed or the materials furnished."'" This notice of lien in
order to be effective must be filed "within six months after the com-
pletion of the labor or the final furnishing of materials.' 2 Failure to
file within this specified time constitutes a fatal forfeiture of the right
to the lien.' 3
When does the filing period of six months begin to run? By N. C.
GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1950),14 the filing period runs from the com-
pletion of the labor or the final furnishing of material. In this respect
it becomes important to determine if the contract is "entire and in-
divisible."'5
Suppose 0 in building a house orders a certain quantity of brick
from B. It is delivered on April 1. On April 7, 0 orders other brick
from B. This is delivered on April 10. Then on May 1, pursuant to
another such order, B delivers certain other brick. B on October 15 files
notice of lien with the clerk of the court claiming a lien for the whole
amount due for the three orders of brick. In an action to enforce this
lien, the lienor, B will find that he has no lien at all on the orders of
brick delivered April 1 and April 10; whereas, he will find that the
lien is effective as to the amount due on the May 1 delivery. The rea-
son is that B delivered brick to 0 under three separate order and
delivery contracts, and not under an entire and indivisible contract.
'Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942); Boykin v. Logan,
203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932); Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20
S. E. 294 (1894).
" Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-38 (1943).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943).
"'Atlas Supply Co. v. McCurry, 199 N. C. 799, 156 S. E. 91 (1930).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943): "Notice of lien shall be filed as herein-
before provided . . . at any time within six months after the completion of the
labor or the final furnishing of the materials... .
"Sides v. Tidwell, 216 N. C. 480, 5 S. E. 2d 316 (1939); King v. Elliott,
197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929).
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Hence, since the filing period of six months runs from the delivery of
each separate order and since here it has run as to the first two orders,
no lien for the amount of the first two orders was acquired by the sub-
sequent filing.
Instead of the above situation, suppose B and 0 had entered a con-
tract whereby B was to furnish a fixed quantity of brick for the con-
struction of the house with deliveries to be on April 1, April 10, and
May 1; and subsequently B filed his notice of lien on October 15. In
this case B perfected his lien for the entire amount due on all three
deliveries as he filed notice within six months of the final furnishing
of material under an entire and indivisible contract. 16
With performance complete under a contract, a debt arises. For
each such debt there is a corresponding right to a lien. Accordingly,
the filing period as to each particular debt and its corresponding lien
runs from the moment the prospective lienor completes performance
under each particular contract.
With the filing of sufficient notice1 7 the mechanic, laborer, or ma-
terialman has perfected his lien.18 Once a lienor has perfected his
lien, the lien relates back and becomes effective as of the time of the
initial furnishing of material or the initial performance of labor under
the contract on which the lien is founded.19
In Burr v. Maultsbyo the plaintiff furnished material and per-
formed labor in repair of property of defendant A. Subsequent to the
completion of this labor and the final furnishing of material, defendant
A conveyed the property to defendant B who took for value and with-
out notice of the plaintiff's claim. The deed from defendant A to
defendant B was duly recorded. Subsequent to these transactions and
within the statutory time allowed, plaintiff filed notice of lien. The
court held that the lien related back to the first furnishing of materials
or performance of labor; and, therefore, the conveyance from defend-
ant A to defendant B was subject to and inferior to the plaintiff's
lien.
16 King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929).
'The problem of sufficiency of notice will not 'be discussed in this note. On
this point see N. C. GEN STAT. §44-38 (1943); King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93,
147 S. E. 701 (1929); Fulp v. Kernersville Light Co., 157 N. C. 157, 72 S. E.
867 (1911) ; Cook v. Cobb, 101 N. C. 68, 7 S. E. 700 (1888).18 Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
"King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929) ; Harris v. Cheshire,
189 N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925); McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167
N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914); Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E.
794 (1896); McNeal Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N. C. 615, 16 S. E.
857 (1892); Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E.
35 (1891) ; Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888) ; Chadbourn v.
Williams, 71 N. C. 444 (1874).
' 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
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In King v. Elliott21 plaintiff furnished material under an entire and
indivisible contract on the dates of July 2, July 15, August 1, and
August 22. Defendant Elliott executed a deed of trust on the property
to the defendant bank as trustee and it was recorded August 1. The
plaintiff lienor filed notice of lien on December 31. Here again the
court held that since the lien related back to the initial furnishing of
material, the materialman's lien was superior to the deed of trust
recorded subsequent to the initial furnishing of materials, yet recorded
prior to the filing of notice of the materialman's lien. Thus it appears
that one taking a mortgage or deed of trust, or purchasing property
cannot rely on the registrations in the lien docket 22 but rather has
the burden of making inquiry as to the existence of potential liens
yet unrecorded but for which there is still time for the lienor to file
notice as required by the statute.23
In McAdams v. Piedmwnt Trust Co. 2 4 plaintiff and defendant A
entered a construction contract on June 14. On July 20 a deed of trust
executed by defendant A to defendant B as trustee was properly
recorded. Labor and materials were first furnished by the plaintiff on
August 7. The court consistent, with other decisions, held that the lien
related back to the initial furnishing of labor and materials and did
not relate back to the date of the contract. Further, the proper and
prior registration of the deed of trust was notice to the plaintiff con-
tractor, and therefore his lien was subject to and inferior to the deed
of trust.
In Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Riverbark,2 5 plaintiff furnished
material to a lessee who had an option to buy. Subsequently, the lessee
took up the option giving a deed of trust to the seller to secure the
purchase price. It was held that the sale with the purchase money deed
of trust back was as a single transaction; the title passed too quickly
for the lien to attach. It may also be reasoned that no lien had been
established. There must be a debt between the lienor and the owner for
a lien to be established. North Carolina being a "title" jurisdiction the
mortgagee is formally the owner, holding the legal title. Since the sale
with the purchase money deed of trust given back is an instantaneous
transaction, the seller-owner after such a transaction becomes the
mortgagee-owner. Since there is no debt as between the material fur-
nisher and the seller-mortgagee-owner, there can be no lien. As to
subsequent encumbrances on the property, the materialman's lien would
be in full force and effect.
" 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929).
" For further discussion in respect to title examination see Boyd, Some Phases
of Title Examination and Real Estate Practice, 20 N. C. L. Ray. 169, 173 (1942).
2- N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943).
2 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
2-231 N. C. 213, 56 S. E. 2d 431 (1949).
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In reaching the solution as to priority between two or more me-
chanic's, laborer's or materialman's liens, the North Carolina General
Assembly has provided a statute26 directly covering the problem.
This statute ekplicitly provides that "liens created and established by
this chapter shall be paid and settled according to the priority of the
notice of the lien filed with . .. the clerk."'27 In Boykinr v. Logan28
it was held that as between parties furnishing labor or materials and
acquiring liens, each of which is properly filed, that lien is superior
which is first filed notwithstanding the fact that the debt giving rise to
this superior lien was not incurred until after the furnishing of labor
or materials giving rise to the later filed liens.20
Thus as long as the contest is between a single statutory lien and
one or more contract encumbrances, or between two or more statutory
liens, absent any contract encumbrances, the law is explicit. To make
a generalization from the above, the law is cleai in any case involving
the priority as between statutory liens and contract liens in any numbers
provided that all of the statutory liens considered individually bear
the same priority relationship to the various contract liens. In a
situation where all of the statutory liens do not bear the same relation.
ship to the contract liens, i.e., one in which a contract lien intervenes
between two or more statutory liens, the application of the existent
North Carolina law produces an anomalous situation.3 0
Suppose pursuant to a contract between A and 0, A furnished
building materials on April 1. On April 15, a deed of trust executed
by 0 to B as trustee was recorded. On May 1, C performed labor for
O pursuant to an independent contract. On May 15, C filed notice of
his lien; and on June 1, A filed notice of his lien. Since 0 had become
insolvent, and his property was not sufficient to pay off the three claims,
the problem before the court is which claim shall be superior.
As between A and B, by application of the rule of relation back
to the date of the initial furnishing of materials, the materialman's lien
of A is superior to the deed of trust subsequently recorded.8 ' As be-
tween B's deed of trust and C's laborer's lien, the deed of trust is
superior, having been properly recorded before the performance of
labor by C;32 and, thereby, C's lien is subject to the deed of trust. If
2 N. C. Gzx STAT. §44-40 (1943).27 N. C. GzN STAT. §44-40 (1943).203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932).
29 For example, A furnishes materials on April 1, and B furnishes materials on
May 1. B files notice of lien on June 1, and then A files notice of his lien on
July 1. Having been recorded first, B's lien is superior to that of A's.
"0 OSBORNF, MORTGAGES 567 (1951).
" King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929); Burr v. Maultsby,
99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
" McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
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this were the whole story, the liens of A, B, and C would rank in this
order of preference. But by applying the statute3 3 and its interpreta-
tion in the Boykin case, notice of C's lien having been filed prior to
the filing of notice of A's lien, C's lien is superior. Thus there is a
vicious circle with each claim at the same time being both superior and,
inferior to the other two claims.
This problem, or problems closely related hereto, has been passed
on in several jurisdictions having lien laws similar to those of North
Carolina. 34 The decisions of these jurisdictions that have passed on
the problem fall into two categories. One group of decisions35 by a
strict and literal construction of the lien statutes holds that all of the
statutory lien claimants should be preferred over the intervening con-
tract lien claimants. The other group of decisions36 holds that an inter-
vening contract encumbrance creates by its intervention different classes
of statutory liens. By applying the relation back rule, it is determined
which liens are superior to the contract lien and which are inferior.3 7
Then, as between these statutory lienors in each class, the priorities will
be determined by applying the usual rule3s as between lien claimants
generally, to each class separately. The reasoning behind these deci-
sions grouping the liens into classes is that the lien which- is subsequent
to and inferior to the contract lien can attach only to the interest of
the owner as of the time the lien is acquired. And, likewise, the lien
superior to the contract lien attaches to the property unencumbered
by the subsequent contract lien.
Though this anomalous situation has never been presented directly
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, one of the following solutions
may be proper, should such a case arise. First, the court might invoke
the class theory. To reach the solution, the court should first apply
the relation back rule to the various liens and thereby establish the
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-40 (1943).
"Pacific States Saving, Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319, 83 P.
513 (1905) ; Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910) ; Gardner v. Leck,
52 Minn. 522, 54 N. W. 746 (1893) ; Finlayson v. Crooks, 47 Minn. 74, 49 N. W.
398 (1891); Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N. W.
643 (1893) ; Meister v. J. Meister, Inc., 103 N. J. Eq. 78, 142 A. 312 (Ch. 1928).
"Gardner v. Leck, 52 Minn. 522, 54 N. W. 746 (1893); Finlayson v. Crooks,
47 Minn. 74, 49 N. W. 398 (1891).
"Pacific States Saving, Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319, 83 P.
513 (1905) ; Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910) ; Henry & Coats-
worth Co. v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N. W. 643 (1893); Meister v. J.
Meister Inc., 103 N. J. Eq. 78, 142 A. 312 (Ch. 1928).
"'Meister v. J. Meister, Inc., 103 N. 3. Eq. 78, 142 A. 312 (Ch. 1928). "Some
lien claims therefore may be prior to the mortgage, and some subsequent, as
here. This divides the lien claims into two classes."
" In some jurisdictions, the statutory lien claimants share pro rata in the
distribution of the debtor's assets; whereas, in other jurisdictions as in North
Carolina, the lien claimants take priority in the order in which they file their
notices of lien.
19511
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classes of liens which are superior or inferior to the intervening con-
tract lien. After the liens have been grouped into classes, the court
should construe N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-40 (1943) to the effect that the
word liens as used in this priority statute means liens of the same class,
and apply it to determine the priority of the various liens within the
individual classes.3 09
Second, the court might dispense with its long established doctrine
of relation back.40 It is true that this rule has time and again been
sanctioned, 41 and there would probably be great hesitancy on the part
of the court to overturn its past ruling. There are some good reasons,
however, that stand in favor of such a reversal by the court. It it true
that Burr v. Maultsby42 takes the position that the filing of notice of lien
is not an essential element to the establishing of a lien effective during
the 6 months' filing period, nor is this necessary in order for the lien to
take precedence over a contract lien recorded subsequently to the first
furnishing of material or performance of labor. By interpreting the
language of the court in the light of the decision it appears that the
court is of the opinion that the purpose of the filing of the notice of
lien is to give the lien life and efficacy after the expiration of the period
of filing. This places the filing of notice of lien in the position of a
condition precedent to the survival of the lien after the passage of the
statutory time for filing.
But in Cook v. Cobb,43 where the labor was performed and notice
of lien filed and subsequently the property was attached and sold for
another indebtedness, the court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
notice as filed, held that the purpose of the notice of lien is to put the
public on notice of the lien established. 44 If indeed the purpose of the
" A statutory amendment could quite simply accomplish the same result.
An amendment would not, however, be necessary.
" This doctrine of relation back applying to liens was first propounded in
1874. Warren v, Woodard, 70 N. C. 382 (1874); Chadburn v. Williams, 71
N. C. 444 (1874).
41 Cases cited note 19 supra.
42 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
"101 N. C. 68, 7 S. E. 700 (1888).
""The obvious purpose of this requirement is to give public notice, in the
offices designated, of the plaintiff's 'claim-his debt-the amount of it, the ma-
terials' supplied or the labor done, when done, on what property, on what farm or
crop, and when, specified in such detail and certainty as will give reasonable
notice to all persons of the character of the 'claim,' and the property to which
the lien, on account of the same, attaches, and of the lien thereby established.
"Otherwise, such filing of the claim and notice thereof and the lien, would
serve no useful purpose, and it would be practically nugatory." Cook v. Cobb,
101 oN. C. 68, 70, 7 S. E. 700, 701 (1888).
Speaking of the lienor's advantage, this court said: If he is to have such
advantage other creditors should know the fact, and the extent of it, to the
end they may have just opportunity the better to determine what extent of
credit the employer should have, and what property of his they might expect to
subject to the payment of their debt against him."
[Vol. 29
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filing of notice of lien is to give notice to creditors of any prior encum-
brances upon the property of the debtor, how can this view be reconciled
with the fact that if a lienor has furnished labor or material before the
recording of a subsequent contract lien and who files after the recording
of the contract lien and within the time for filing, the lien is superior to
the contract lien even though the contract lienor had no notice actual or
constructive of the existence of the lien?
The relation back doctrine when first applied, was predicated on N.
C. CODE (1883) §178245 in 1874.46 The doctrine was again applied
by referring to the same statute in 1888. 47 This statute was general
applying to work on crops, farms, and for materials furnished;48 and
by direct implication it required the relation back rule. In the REvIsAL
OF 1905, the statute was modified so as to restrict its application to
liens for work done on crops. 49 Notwithstanding this change, the
court has continued to apply the relation back rule to mechanic's, la-
borer's, or materialman's liens on subject matter other than work done on
crops."0 Thus the rule still stands even though its statutory founda-
tion has been removed.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-38 (1943) is a further argument for abandon-
ing the relation back doctrine. Its emphasis is upon the time of filing
rather than on the time of the initial furnishing, on the detail with
which notice is to be filed. The degree of detail required would seem
to be indicative of the legislature's intent that this notice should be
directed to subsequent creditors of any class seeking security in the
property of the owner-debtor. N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-39 (1943) ex-
pressly provides that as between lien claimants the date of the filing of
their notices of lien determines the priority. N. C. GEN,. STAT. §44-42
(1943) rl also indicates the emphasis that the statutes place on the filing
of the notice of the lien.
Thus it seems that there are good grounds on which a repudiation
'N. C. Laws 1869-70, c. 206, §2.
"Warren v. Woodard, 70 N. C. 382 (1874); Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N.
C. 444 (1874).
"'Burr v. Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888).
48 N. C. CODE (1883) §1782: "The lien for work on crops or farms or ma-
terials given by this chapter shall be preferred to every other lien or incumbrance,
which attached upon the property subsequent to the time at which the work
was commenced or the materials were furnished"
"' N. C. REVISAL OF 1905 §2034: "The lien for work on crops given by this
chapter shall be preferred to every other lien or incumbrance which attached
to the crops subsequent to the time at which the work was commenced."
" King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929); Harris v. Cheshire,
189 N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925) ; McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C.
494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-42 (1943): "Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to affect the rights of any person to whom any debt may be due for any
work done for which priority of claim is flied with the proper officer."
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of the relation back rule may be based. With such a repudiation of
the relation back rule, priority, as between liens and contract liens or
any combination thereof, would simply depend on the times of the
filing of notices of lien or recording of the contract liens.
Furthermore, in Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church,52 the
court held, in deciding a venue question, that as far as an interest in
real property is concerned there is no essential difference between a
statutory lien and a contract lien.52 Hence, there is little reason why
the recordation of statutory liens and the recordation of contract liens
should not be given the same effect. This would make the rules easy
of application and produce uniformity in lien law generally.
WILLIAm H. BonBirr, JR.
Pleading-Unnecessary Allegations in Answer-Motion to Strike
Plaintiff instituted an action against defendant administrator to com-
pel defendant to pay plaintiff, as sole distributee, assets of the estate of
one Arsemus Chandler. Plaintiff alleged that he was born of the mar-
riage between Arsemus Chandler and Della Fender Hensley and is the
son and only heir of Arsemus Chandler. The defendant specifically
denied this allegation and for further answer and defense set out
matter to the effect that plaintiff was born to Della Fender more than
two years after she and Arsemus Chandler separated and that plaintiff
was not the son of Arsemus Chandler. In apt time plaintiff moved to
strike this further answer and defense. The motion was overruled. In
an opinion by Justice Winborne the North Carolina Supreme Court
reversed saying;
"The plea of denial controverts and raises an issue of fact between the
parties as to each material allegation denied, and forces the plaintiff to
prove them.. . . averments of evidence which defendant contends sustain
his denial of the controverted facts are irrelevant as pleading and have
no place in the answer .... 1
This decision seems inconsistent with an earlier case where the
allegation sought to be stricken was but an, elaboration of the denial
previously made. The trial judge refused to strike the unnecessary
allegation. The Supreme Court affirmed, saying that since under the
denial the evidence would be competent with or without the explanatory
-2226 N. C. 171, 37 S. E. 2d 177 (1946).
"'And we see no essential difference in so far as an interest in real property
is involved, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a lien created by contract, and
in one to foreclose a specific statutory lien on real property." Penland v,
Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N. C. 171, 173, 37 S. E. 2d 177 (1946).
' Chandler v. Mashburn, 233 N. C. 277, 63 S. E. 2d 553 (1951).
[Vol. 29
